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I. Introduction
Reasons:
a. Tactical: The general situation at all German battle fronts which became more serious every week; the information, however scanty, regarding the concentration of enemy troops in England and the completion of Anglo-American preparations for the invasion. If the enemy would correctly conduct his operations, the attack was to be expected in the course of the year 1944, and more specifically during the summer because of normally unfavorable weather starting in October.
b. Terrain: The coast from the mouth of the Orne until Arromanches was flat; the reefs and sandbanks which rose at some places before the coast were not necessarily obstacles. Errors excepted. (S.E. - salvo errors?) From the coast inland to the south of Caen extended a flat plain, providing almost no cover, without any woods, without any embankments or brushwood and without any natural obstacles and cuts in the terrain, particularly without any running parallel to the coastline. There fore favorable terrain to the aggressor for air borne, landings from ships, motorized movements for all types of units and at the same time favorable to the air force for observation, bombing and low-flight attack. Unfavorable for defense as in this open terrain every movement, the moving up and transferring of reserves, a counter attack, and supply could be spotted from the air and partly from the sea during the day and was also difficult to make at night because of the air superiority of the enemy was known to us.
The terrain in the adjacent sectors, to the coast of the Orne to the mouth of the Seine and to the west to Cherbourg was mostly of the opposite nature, unfavorable to the aggressor and favorable to the defense.
For these reasons I expected the attack to take place west of the Orne; it could not be determined exactly where, but within the sector of the division in any event.
The commanding general, General der Artl. Marcks, was of the same opinion. For this reason the division sector was cut by two thirds during the month of November 1943, as far as I can remember. Previously the sector had extended to the area west of the mouth of the Vire. a. It is certain that the defensive fortifications in the coastal sector of the division were in no way sufficient to repel the attack of a modern army; this situation was taken into consideration by me and by all commands up to OK West in connection with all questions relating to the expected battle. From the beginning on the question of the same: construction of fortifications in depth or only field position in front, behind these strong reserves and reliance upon our own counter attack. This question had been decided at the end of 1942 in favor of con structure and of but fortifications (“idea” of the Atlantic Wall). At any rate two years (1942 to 1944) had been lost during which nothing or just simple field positions had been constructed. Construction of fortifications on the coast in the division sector was but speeded up since the beginning of 1943, but always occupied second place after Cherbourg. In addition to this, increasing difficulties were encountered from the January, 1944 on, in supplying material due to the systematic destruction of French railroads and waterways by the enemy air force.
b. at the beginning of the invasion the construction of fortifications in the division sector was in the following stages: *) “Completed” always means here: concrete constructions completed and filled in, armament installed. Obstacles, mine fields, etc., were constantly in need of improvements.
(1). West of the mouth of the Orne: (Arromanches – Orne) Infantry strong points: Courseulles half completed, I.e. west of the mouth of the Seulles. Rivabella (Ouistreham) completed.
Another series of strong points which were going to be fortified were under construction. The majority of these strong points in the form of field emplacements and some of them in the form of fortified field emplacements (30 cm concrete) were completed.
Battery positions: (army and coast artillery) Rivabella battery completed. All others under construction. Two positions of the division artillery and reinforcement artillery were completed in the form of fortifications, the form of field emplacements.
(2). East of the Orne: Infantry strong points: completed Battery Positions: 1 position was completed.
(3). What was lacking in the fortifications was depth. The strong points and the resistance points totalling from 40 to 50 in the entire division sector we're placed along the coastline in the shape of a string of pearls. Depth was provided by the gun positions in the field of the division and by the reinforcement artillery and the communities, occupied by troops, which had been prepared for defense. However, not all communities were occupied. But the air force strong point of Douves which had been most heavily fortified by the Luftwaffe resisted until about 15 June. The construction of field positions in depth in areas between successive positions had started, as far as I remember, in the following areas: Area Deuvaines-Vers sur Mere; north of Bainville, Reviers – Taileville, North of Dalevrande, Area Plumetot – Hermanville S.W. - Colleville – Hill 61; east of the Orne: Area Salenelles – Merville – Merville – Franceville – Coneville. [ Spelling of the French names is the author's] Part of the emplacements had only been designated, obstacles were not established in most cases.
(4). Minelaying and wire obstacles against air borne landings. Mines were laid extensively from the coast towards the sea. The depth of these obstacles in the area before the beach amounted from 200 to 1,200 meters towards the sea, depending upon the tide. Mines and grenades were placed in all types of obstacles on land.
Mining of the area from the coast inland:
Depth from 300 to 800 meters, along almost entire area. In depth mining of the communities, defiles, etc,.
Wire Obstacles: each strong point was surrounded by wire. Battery emplacements, command posts in most cases (shortage of wire). In the entire coastal area down to both sides of Caen and to the south wire obstacles were planned against landings from the air. In certain places plans were carried out to cover areas of ½ to 3 km. To carry out these plans several millions of stakes each 5 meters long and 30 cm in diameter would have been needed, in addition to wire and mines.
(5). Since Feldmarshall Rommel took over command the following principles dominated: The enemy must be beaten on the sea and on the beach. Sections which succeeded in penetrating should become entangled in mine fields many km. deep and air borne troops should get stuck in similar wire and mine fields.
For mining and wire obstacles see d. In addition to this all available immobile weapons should be built in, should cover the beach and the sea and should be able to observe those directly; they should therefore be established in the most advanced line or very close behind it, as was e.g. 2. Pz. Jg. Kompanie of the division, which was lined up as an emergency unit. The division and the corps proposed that these weapons (7,5 Pak, mortars, heavy machine guns) be built in depth as a support for defense and counter attack, as the beach and the sea were in the range of both the well armed strong points and of the artillery along the entire area . Feldmarshall Rommel's principle was certainly correct, if behind the division a second or also a third division would have stood in reserve, the weapons of which would have formed an intensification of the barrage fire on the beach and the sea and depth for the defense. In this way however , everything was staked too much on one card . The proposal made by the divisions and the corps was declined. The invasion has shown that these weapons together with a number of strong point emplacements in the fields became a sacrifice to the bombers and the ship's artillery, without ever really being put in but action.
3. Defensive position of the division.
a. The division had been alerted by the alert order of the 7. Armee of December 1943 or January 1944 which stated that the division should be alerted by 15 February 1944 I.e. clearing of quarters by headquarters and reserves and occupying of command posts and intermediate positions, which were either fortified or should be fortified further. The two Pi-Kompanien of Pi-B.716 were distributed over the division sector for the construction of obstacles and laying of mines. The Pionier-Batl. was to establish one company in Nathlen, the other one in Herouvilette when alarm stage 11 was announced, which was the code word for an enemy attack. Ostbatl. 642, employed in construction work east of the Orne, was to assemble in Amfreville. Of the 21.Pz. Div. The reinforced 7./pz/Gren. Regt. 192 was placed under tactical command [of the 716 Div.] in field emplacements to the north of Periers and I./Artl.155 in position in the area Beuville – Periers. Futhermore of the 21.Pz. Div. the 11./192 was located to the north of Caen in the area Villons – Cairon – Buron and the 11./125 to the east of the Orne near Troam and to the west of it. Both battalions were located in such a manner that they could engage in action around the mouth of the Orne. The battalions which were committed in the most advanced line were placed in their strong points and resistance points and the artillery was located in its gun positions. The reserve battalions of the division were located in the intermediate areas (11./726 and 111./736).
b. Through an extensive system of aircraft warning, reconnaissance patrols, fighter parties, etc., observation of the air in the entire battle area to the north of Caen was guaranteed day and night.
c. During the night of 6 to 7 June the enemy was extremely active in the air. Therefore the troops which previously had often been bombed at night in positions were alerted without reading the order.
4. Weather conditions and position of the tides.
Strong wind from northwestern direction. Sea moderate. Full moon, but sky clouded. High tide 5 June 2230 hours, 6 June 1944 1050 hours.
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